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In April 1947, George F. Kennan was instructed by Secretary of State George Marshall to 
set up a Policy Planning Staff in response to the economic crisis in Europe following World War 
II. Secretary Marshall famously offered only one piece of advice to Kennan for the 
unprecedented endeavor: “avoid trivia.”2  In a memo to his new team, Kennan summed up the 
greatest freedoms and constraints for the potential of policy planning as an institutionalized 
exercise: “Many of the questions may look so naively broad as to horrify the scholarly 
economist. If so, tell your people to disregard their consciences, take a deep breath, and let us 
have their best guess.”3  Despite this uncertainty, Kennan’s formation of the first Policy Planning 
Staff (S/P) combined with Marshall’s advice, produced a new type of agency with a uniquely 
broad policy vision.  Their integration of grand strategy in policymaking was special to the S/P 
and sparked a new era of U.S. policymaking exemplified by its first major accomplishment, the 
Marshall Plan, and with it, the reconstruction of a crumbling Europe. 
While post-war periods often witness great change, the ability of Kennan and his five-
man staff to come together across agencies to develop a uniquely interdependent U.S. policy 
towards Europe’s reconstruction represented a paradigm shift in the formation of U.S. foreign 
policy.  In the words of Dean Acheson, the S/P has held the same role since its inception in 1947: 
To anticipate the emerging form of things to come, to reappraise policies which had acquired their own 
momentum and went on after the reasons for them had ceased, and to stimulate and, when necessary, to 
devise basic policies crucial to the conduct of our foreign affairs.4 
 
																																																								
1 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), 31.  
2 Ibid. 
3 George Kennan, “Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Assistant Secretary of 
State for Economic Affairs (Thorp),” June 24, 1947, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The British 
Commonwealth; Europe, Volume III, Lot 122, Box 13113. 
4 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (Neuaufl. New York, NY: Norton, 
1987); Nicolas Guilhot, ed, The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the  
Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 290; 
“Policy Planning Staff.” U.S. Department of State, n.d. http://www.state.gov/s/p/. 
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However, like all institutions, the S/P has failed, succeeded, strayed, and expanded from its 
defined role in its many iterations since 1947.  Notably, the S/P experienced what many refer to 
as its “golden-age” following the appointment of Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State in 1973, 
despite the U.S. mood following the Watergate Scandal and Vietnam War.5  Kissinger’s 
reputation as a prolific grand strategist and practitioner of realpolitik in the Cold War era as 
National Security Advisor (1969-1975) foreshadowed the importance he would place on this 
type of long-term policy analysis in his role as secretary of state.  
 Given Secretary Kissinger’s inclination towards grand strategy, he afforded significant 
priority to the S/P during his tenure as secretary from 1973 to 1977.  One of Kissinger’s first 
actions as secretary was to appoint his former Special Assistant (1970-1973), Winston Lord, as 
Director of the S/P.6  In my interviews with Lord, he attributed the S/P’s increased influence both 
to Kissinger’s strategic and conceptual approach to foreign policy as well as the loss of executive 
authority following the Watergate Crisis, which opened up space to formulate policy 
independently.7  
The existing literature on the S/P offers robust discussions of the utility and purpose of 
long-term foreign policy planning.  However, the literature fails to properly analyze the 
individual efforts of the S/P, typically mentioning the 1973 to 1977 period simply as a “golden 
age for policy planners.”8  Most serious academic works tend towards political science and focus 
on debating the utility of policy planning over its seventy-year history, without focusing on 
																																																								
5 Linda Brady, “Planning for Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis.” International Journal XXXII, no. 4 
(Autumn 1977), https://libres.uncg.edu/ir/uncg/f/L_Brady_Planning_1977.pdf; Lucian Pugliaresi and Diana T. 
Berliner, “Policy Analysis at the Department of State: The Policy Planning Staff,” Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Summer, 1989), pp. 379- 394 (Wiley on behalf of Association for Public Policy 
Analysis and Management), accessed http://www.jstor.org/stable/3324930. 
6 Further, in a guest lecture given to former Policy Planning speechwriter, Charles Hill’s Yale University course 
“GLBL 885: World Order”, Secretary Henry Kissinger spoke about the unique importance of Policy Planning to him 
and to his conception of world geopolitical order, April 2016. 
7 Interview with Winston Lord, conducted June 27, 2017 via telephone. 
8 Brady, “Planning for Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis;” Pugliaresi and Berliner, “Policy Analysis at the 
Department of State: The Policy Planning Staff.” 
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individual contributions of the S/P to specific episodes in foreign affairs after Kennan.9  Another 
genre of scholarship ignores Lord and the S/P, instead attributing policy formation directly to 
Kissinger, discounting any influence from the wider bureaucracy.10  Finally, the most predictably 
problematic contributions come from Kissinger himself, who sparingly discusses the S/P on only 
30 pages in over 3,500 pages of his personal memoirs, exhibiting a tendency not to credit his 
influencers.11 
 This essay contributes to existing analyses on state planning and foreign policy decision-
making by offering a comprehensive discussion of two case studies in U.S. long-term foreign 
policy planning from the perspective of Lord’s S/P.  Using event-specific methodology, it is 
possible to focus on Lord and this specific iteration of the S/P to determine the factors that 
allowed for long-term planning’s effectiveness, and to evaluate the influence of the S/P on 
																																																								
9 Bruce W. Jentleson and Andrew BENNET, “Policy Planning: Oxymoron or Sine Eua Non for U.S. Foreign 
Policy,” pp. 219 – 246, in Stanley Allen Renshon and Deborah Welch Larson, eds., Good Judgment in Foreign 
Policy: Theory and Application (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003); Brady, “Planning for Foreign Policy: 
A Framework for Analysis;” Daniel Drezner, ed., “Planning for Policy Planning,” In Avoiding Trivia, 23–33, Project 
MUSE (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), http://muse.jhu.edu/chapter/1198450; Lincoln Bloomfield, 
“Planning Foreign Policy: Cant It Be Done?” The Academy of Political Sciences 93, no. 3 (August 1978), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2149530; Douglas Brinkley, ed., Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993);  
10 John Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2007); Jussi M Hanhimäki, The 
Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); 
Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2013); Roger Morris, 
Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, (New York: Harper & Row, 1977); John 
George Stoessinger, Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power  (New York: Norton, 1976); Richard Valeriani, Travels 
with Henry (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979); Harry Mason Joiner, American Foreign Policy: The Kissinger Era 
(Huntsville, Ala: Strode Publishers, 1977). 
11 This tendency to not credit his influencers is documented in wide-ranging Kissinger studies as well as Lord’s oral 
history.  Lord described Kissinger’s tendency to contest opposing views to his own, and if he was convinced by 
someone else to include this new thinking into his own statements, he would do so without attributing credit to the 
original source.  However, this seems to be a tendency of his working career that he has begun to rethink given the 
importance Dr. Kissinger prescribed to his “working groups” or the Policy Planning Staff in an April 2016 lecture at 
Yale University. Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1999); Henry Kissinger, 
Years of Upheaval, First Simon & Schuster trade paperback ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster trade paperbacks, 
2011); Henry Kissinger, White House Years, First Simon & Schuster trade paperback ed. (New York: Simon & 
Schuster trade paperbacks, 2011); Charles Stuart Kennedy and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Interview with Ambassador 
Winston Lord, transcript of an oral history conducted on April 28, 1998 by Charles Kennedy and Nancy Tucker, 
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Library of Congress, 
Manuscript Division, accessed http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Lord,%20Winston.pdf; Dr. Henry Kissinger, 
Lecture, “GLBL 885: World Order,” Professor Charles Hill, Yale University Jackson Institute for Global Affairs, 
New Haven, CT, April 2016. 
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Secretary Kissinger’s individual power to shape U.S. foreign policy.  By tracing a foreign policy 
decision from its introduction in the State Department to a major turning point through S/P 
analysis and memos, the S/P’s individual role becomes evident.  In this period, the S/P took the 
lead on cross-agency issues, linked operational policy decisions with established long-term U.S. 
strategic principles, and most importantly had a tangible influence on the decision-making of 
Secretary Kissinger. 
 This essay begins with a discussion of the most pertinent theoretical scholarship from 
historians and political scientists on the utility and role of state planning in U.S. foreign policy, 
offering definitions from political scientist Linda Brady and Lord for the two opposite operating 
styles of policy planning bodies: as an academic body versus a bureaucratic actor.   It then traces 
the historiography of the S/P, its purpose, and its development by Kissinger and Lord.  Then, this 
essay utilizes two case studies, the Law of Sea (LOS) Negotiations and shifting U.S. policy 
towards human rights in southern Africa, in order to follow the evolution of State Department 
policy from the introduction of an issue to a major policy pronouncement.12  Although the S/P 
did not serve identical roles in the two case studies, the cases serve as examples of the wide-
ranging utility of Lord’s S/P under Kissinger.  In the LOS Negotiations from 1973 to 1976, the 
S/P tended towards the bureaucratic actor role, formulating day-to-day negotiating strategy, 
writing speeches for Kissinger, and negotiating between competing U.S. agencies.  The Africa 
case study, culminating in Kissinger’s April 27, 1976 speech in Lusaka, Zaire, illuminates the 
long-term strategic thinking executed within the S/P.  Through the extensive use of original S/P 
memos, the cases tangibly illustrate the influence of Lord and his S/P from 1973 to 1977 on the 
																																																								
12 Southern Africa is used throughout the S/P archives as well as this essay typically to denote South Africa and 
Rhodesia (and in some cases Botswana and Zambia).  Rhodesia was an unrecognized state in southern Africa from 
1965 to 1979, known as the Republic of Rhodesia from 1970 onwards, and Zimbabwe in 1980. 
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decision-making of Secretary Kissinger and thus on the formulation of U.S. foreign policy in the 
period. 
 
I. The Debated Utility of the Policy Planning Staff 
Despite its consistency of mission, the S/P has changed names, shrunk, and expanded, all 
while exhibiting varying levels of influence on the secretary and U.S. foreign policymaking.  
Most scholars acknowledge the dramatic impact of Kennan’s S/P in 1947, but many like Linda 
P. Brady suggest a drastic decline of S/P influence immediately following this period, 
culminating in an all-time low from 1961 to 1966 under Director Walt Rostow.13  Despite its 
rejuvenation in 1973 with Kissinger’s move to the Department of State, the S/P has been both 
praised and criticized, producing only a mixed evaluation of its effectiveness in the policy-
making process.14 
Political scientists of the 20th and 21st centuries divide their analysis of policy planning 
into two general schools of thought: planning as intellectual activity and planning as political 
process.  Brady offers a neat framework defining both, which aligns with Lord’s own analysis.  
Planning as intellectual activity, or the “Ivory Tower” school, is the “’thinker’ model of foreign-
policy planning.”15  In this model S/P responsibilities are limited to the “setting of objectives, 
forecasting, post-hoc analysis, and the formulation of ‘unthinkable’ alternatives.  At no point 
does the staff become an active lobbyist for its proposals.  Nor does the staff serve as co-
coordinator of goal-setting or option-formulation activities performed by other bureaucratic 
actors.”  In other words, “planning is not responding to cables, not coordination, and not speech 
																																																								
13 Generally, under Director Walt Rostow, most S/P efforts pertaining to Vietnam went unheeded by Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk. David Milne, America's Rasputin: Walt Rostow and the Vietnam War (New York: Hill and Wang, 
2008). 
14 Brady, “Planning for Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis;” Pugliaresi and Berliner, “Policy Analysis at the 
Department of State: The Policy Planning Staff;” Drezner, ed., “Planning for Policy Planning;” Bloomfield, 
“Planning Foreign Policy: Cant It Be Done?”  
15 Kennedy and Tucker, Interview with Winston Lord, 323. 
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writing.”16  Conversely, Brady and Lord define planning as political process as the “bureaucratic 
actor” method or the “overly operational” model.  In this second model, “planning has an impact 
on policy only if planners are influential.  Planners are not only thinkers, but also actors in a 
bureaucratic game.”17  If policy planners do not hold bargaining chips against other bureaucratic 
actors, they are unlikely to influence policy.  They must advance their own analysis and advocate 
within the State Department. 
Lord understood these dynamics and knew that a major avenue for his own influence and 
that of the S/P came through his personal relationship with Secretary Kissinger.18  As Director of 
the S/P, Lord acknowledged his power when he said: “I had the carrot because I had all of the 
advantages I mentioned, in terms of access to the Secretary of State and to information. The 
regional and functional bureaus knew that I was obviously plugged in to the Secretary, 
personally and professionally, and in terms of information.19  This relationship put Lord in a 
privileged position within the State Department and elevated the role of the S/P as a mediator 
and clearinghouse for agencies’ competing interests and State Department coordination. 
More recent scholarship continues to comment on the period of relative influence 
exhibited by Lord and the S/P from 1973 to 1977.20  In one of his first actions as secretary, 
Kissinger appointed Lord as director reflecting the primacy he placed on conceptual frameworks 
and long-term thinking.21  Echoing this, in one of my interviews with Lord, he asserted that the 
																																																								
16 Brady, “Planning for Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis.” 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid.  Brady cites conversations with multiple members of the Policy Planning Staff as her source for this 
information.  Similarly, Lord discussed at length his personal relationship with Kissinger in his oral history, 
Kennedy, Charles Stuart, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, and Winston Lord, Interview with Winston Lord; This is reflected 
yet again in many correspondences between the Lord’s and Kissinger’s in Lord’s Archival papers, S/P Files of 
Winston Lord: Record Group 59 Entry A1-5027, National Archives II, College Park, MD. 
19 Kennedy and Tucker, Interview with Winston Lord, 323. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Further, in a guest lecture given to former Policy Planning speechwriter, Charles Hill’s Yale University course 
“GLBL 885: World Order”, Secretary Henry Kissinger spoke about the unique importance of Policy Planning to him 
and to his conception of world geopolitical order, April 2016. 
 7 
key variant for this specific S/P was Kissinger himself and his “conceptual and strategic outlook, 
which linked issues together and looked beyond the immediate crisis,” not the nature of the 
issues in the 1970s.22  Similarly, Kissinger, an iconoclastic figure typically portrayed as 
monolithic, secretive, and individualistic, spoke with great reverence for Lord and the work of 
the S/P: “our [State Department] analytical and conceptual capabilities have been greatly 
enhanced by giving the Policy Planning Staff a central position in the organization.”23  Both Lord 
and many scholars attribute this period of effectiveness, in part, to Kissinger’s approach to 
foreign policy as well as the close relationship between Lord and Kissinger, stemming from 
Lord’s tenure as Kissinger’s Special Assistant to the National Security Advisor from 1970 to 
1973.24   
On the other hand, there are some who assert Lord’s tenure did not represent “golden-
age” for policy planning.  Richard Haass, the Director of the S/P from 2001 to 2003, discounts 
the record of Lord and Kissinger as unidimensional while discussing the crises and major events, 
like the end of WWII and the September 11 terrorist attacks, that make policymakers more 
receptive to the ideas of policy planning:  
In the 1960s and 1970s, most of the thinking in American foreign policy was contained within a paradigm – 
containment – in the context of the cold war.  This was not a time for producing new paradigms, but for 
operating within an existing one at a refined and defined level.  It was not as glorious a moment for policy 
planning as others.25 
 
While Haass correctly identifies the Cold War era containment policy that characterized much of 
foreign policymaking in the 1960s and 70s, this does not mean that policy planning was 
ineffective or unable to produce new paradigms.26  In fact, many major successes of the S/P from 
																																																								
22 Interview with Winston Lord, conducted June 27, 2017 via telephone. 
23 Bloomfield, “Planning Foreign Policy: Cant It Be Done?” 
24 Kennedy and Tucker, Interview with Winston Lord, 100-104. 
25 Drezner, ed., “Planning for Policy Planning.” 
26 Under the recommendation of Diplomat George F. Kennan, the United States adopted “a policy of firm 
containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs 
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1973 to 1977 came from exploiting Kissinger’s tendency to frame problems in this to advance 
their own analysis and in many cases establish new paradigms, as with human rights policy and 
black majority rule in southern Africa.  As the two case studies show, the S/P served as a conduit 
to Kissinger and thus for the formation of State Department policy on a wide range of issues, 
despite its lack of operational expertise in some of these areas. 
 
II. Winston Lord’s Policy Planning Staff from 1973 to 1977 
To analyze the 1973 to 1977 period, it is first important to note how Kissinger and Lord 
changed the structure of the Policy Planning Staff after taking office in 1973.27  In a memo dated 
April 10, 1974, Lord and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph Sisco laid out a 
plan, “Towards a More Systematic Policy Planning Process.”  The memo evolved out of a March 
22 conversation between Kissinger and Lord and revealed that Kissinger requested a study to 
expand the role of the S/P.28  Lord and Sisco criticized the overly operational leanings of the 
State Department which prevented more imaginative, forward-thinking: “the necessary 
preoccupation of the bureaus with daily decision-making absorbs their attention and often 
produces a spiral of short-term solutions to immediate issues raised by you [Secretary Kissinger] 
or other principals.”29  Similarly, they described the technical details required to implement a 
process they name “conceptualization,” defined as the formulation of a broader framework 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
of encroaching upon the interest of a peaceful and stable world.” Kissinger continued this policy of containment into 
the 1960s and 1970s through his engagement in proxy wars attempting to limit the spread of Communism and 
minimize the Soviet sphere of influence abroad. Mr. X (George F. Kennan), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 
Foreign Affairs, July 1947, accessed March 1, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-
federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal 
of American National Security Policy during the Cold War. Rev. and expanded ed. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005). 
27 Lord changed the name from the Office of Policy Planning to the Policy Planning Staff to realign his S/P with that 
of Geroge Kennan, the first and most senior director of the S/P forty years prior. Ibid, 346. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Winston Lord and Joseph Sisco, “Action Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs 
(Sisco) and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger,” April 10, 1974, Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1969 – 1976, Volume XXXVIII, Part 2, Organization and Management of the 
Foreign Policy; Public Diplomacy, 1973 – 1976. 
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within which major issues are defined and policy recommendations put forward in order to 
address the need to anticipate emerging form of things to come (i.e. long-term planning). 30  The 
restructuring placed increased importance on the S/P and on forward-looking policy analysis, 
even in regions that were not currently priorities.31  Thus, the goal of the earlier conversation and 
this subsequent restructuring was to create a more systematic policy planning process by 
anticipating future events and formulating a “menu” of solutions that fit within U.S. foreign 
policy principles before events occurred.  Rather than being reactionary, policy was to be 
visionary. 
Reflecting in 2017, forty years after his directorship, Lord believed that there were four 
ingredients necessary for a successful S/P.  Firstly, the secretary of state must be conceptual and 
strategic.  This means he/she is willing envision policy in the future rather than being “lawyerly” 
or focused on day-to-day tactics.  Secondly the director of the S/P and the secretary of state need 
a close professional and personal relationship so that the S/P’s work will be received and taken 
seriously.  Thirdly, the S/P must have access to the best possible people, particularly emerging 
stars in the State Department.  Kissinger told Lord that “anyone he wanted he could get” to form 
his new staff in 1973.  Finally, the S/P must have access to as much information as possible.  
Lord received total information from Kissinger including things that were top-secret, which 
allowed him both to make the most informed analysis possible but also gave him leverage with 
other Bureaus.32   
																																																								
30 In the memo Lord and Sisco go on to describe the technical details required to implement “conceptualization” and 
the development of a framework for analysis. The suggestions include regular Analytical Staff Meetings, “devoted 
to reviewing with Principals, Assistant Secretaries and others as appropriate an alert list of events or trends for then 
next six months…to provide a good forum for keeping you [Kissinger] and the principals abreast of future 
developments and for assuring such developments do not catch [them] off guard,” which would allow for solutions 
to be formed before they were necessary to avoid inadequate reactionary responses to world issues, Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Interview with Winston Lord, conducted June 27, 2017 via telephone. 
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To some, the newly structured S/P could appear to represent an institution designed to 
reinforce Kissinger’s grand strategic frameworks.  Therefore, the measure of Lord’s independent 
influence rested on his ability to work within this framework to advance his and the S/P’s 
viewpoints that differed from those of Kissinger.  However, some assert instead that this 
reinforced the “inner-circle” theory of Kissinger’s secretive politics, suggesting that Lord and the 
people appointed by or serving underneath Kissinger were installed to reinforce existing 
viewpoints rather than act as independent advisors.33  In other words, Kissinger controlled the 
show, and those around him were simply “yes-men.”  Lord displayed an understanding of both 
of these concepts in his oral history: 
People would come to me and ask me what kind of arguments would appeal to Kissinger and the best way 
to go about approaching him. I always tried to be helpful, in the national interest and in the interests of 
Kissinger and the various bureaus in the State Department that were asking my views. Also, I like to get 
along with people. I thought that made me more popular but also probably more effective, if they figured 
that I was cooperative, as opposed to outmaneuvering them and using my insider status to unfair 
advantage.34 
 
However, his ability to serve the interests of Kissinger, the various bureaus in the State 
Department, and understanding of his privileged position of influence provides support for 
Lord’s characterization as a savvy political operator working within an established bureaucracy.  
Lord displayed an acute understanding of his boss’s bias, admitting that he may have 
overemphasized over emphasized the East-West aspect of foreign policy, which suggested that 
Lord did not seek to appease Kissinger but dealt with him effectively. 35  By understanding how 
to package ideas outside the scope of Kissinger’s interests within his framework, Lord advanced 
the opinions and policies of the S/P and other bureaus within the State Department. 
In a final example to establish Lord’s independence from Kissinger, Lord conducted 
certain actions of the S/P without Kissinger’s approval.  In the original 1973 memo reorganizing 
																																																								
33 Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992). 
34 Kennedy and Tucker, Interview with Winston Lord, 328. 
35 Ibid, 338. 
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the S/P, Lord and Sisco concluded by advocating for greater transparency and information 
sharing despite Kissinger’s well-known preference for secrecy.  Lord took it upon himself to 
review what happened at meetings with Kissinger at regular staff meetings of the S/P as a 
management tactic and to boost team morale.  Lord understood the significance of this practice:  
I never let Kissinger know how much I was telling all of my people.  I needed their help; I needed their 
thinking.  This, in turn, helped Kissinger and the national interest.  I wanted to promote good morale.  I also 
told them that, because of the sensitivity of some of the subjects, I counted on their discretion.36 
 
By acknowledging that this practice was contrary to Kissinger’s wishes, Lord provides concrete 
evidence for his ability to act independently from Kissinger, despite their close relationship. 
While it is clear Lord influenced the structure and scope of the S/P during his tenure as 
director, it is more complicated to examine his influence on policy formulation and on the 
decision-making of Kissinger.  It is also important to note that it is difficult to disaggregate the 
efforts of the S/P staff and of Lord himself, as all S/P memos came through Lord to Kissinger.  
However, the goal of this essay will be to use to an event-specific methodology to 
chronologically trace the efforts of Lord’s S/P.  The following sections will trace two case 
studies—the Law of Sea Treaty negotiations from 1973 to 1976 and shifting U.S. policy towards 
human rights in southern Africa—in order to analyze the successes and mechanisms by which 
the S/P was able to influence the U.S. foreign policymaking of Kissinger. 
 
III. Law of the Sea Negotiations from 1973 to 197637 
“No current international negotiation is more vital for the long-term stability and prosperity of 
our globe.”38 
-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
 
																																																								
36 Ibid, 327-328. 
37 Figure 1 in the Appendix offer visual representations of the many terms used to describe different levels of ocean 
jurisdiction and the “exclusive economic zone” concept that will appear throughout this section. 
38 Speech by Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State, to American Bar Association Annual Convention, “International 
Law, World Order, and Human Progress,” Montreal, Canada, August 11, 1975, University of Minnesota, accessed 
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951d02488168t?urlappend=%3Bseq=3. 
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One of the major contributions and institutional roles of the S/P was to take the lead on 
issues that cut across the interests of several bureaus or agencies.  The preparation and execution 
of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) negotiations 
spanned the Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department as well as military and economic 
bureaus.  Given that Secretary Kissinger attended the 1973 UNCLOS III planning meeting in 
New York City and again in 1976, the S/P was heavily involved in the formulation of U.S. policy 
and the synthesis of many different bureaus’ policymaking process. Lord believed his staff was 
uniquely able to act as an “honest broker…looking at the issue from the global perspective of the 
President and the Secretary of State.”39  Given the lack of international consensus on the issue of 
the seas, the LOS negotiations still remained uncharted waters. 40  As a result, U.S. policy was 
formulated from the ground-up by the S/P, culminating in a speech by Secretary Kissinger on 
April 8, 1976. 
The LOS negotiations of the 1970s represented a culmination of over thirty years of 
uncertainty with regards to international sea rights.  With the Truman Proclamation of September 
28, 1945, the U.S. set off what is referred to as a great “sea rush,” claiming continental shelves as 
territory and developing plans to exploit marine resources in indeterminate areas.  This declared 
the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the seas and 
contiguous to American coasts as belonging to the U.S., subject to its jurisdiction and control.  In 
the words of Jorge Coquia, a member of the Philippine delegation of UNCLOS III and Chairman 
of the delegation of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, “the United States, in effect, 
claim[ed] all resources of a sea area over 700,000 square miles,” and in response, “many other 
																																																								
39 Kennedy and Tucker, Interview with Winston Lord, 334. 
40 Before UNCLOS III, the international community had convened for previous U.N. Conventions on the Law of the 
Sea, namely UNCLOS I in 1958 and UNCLOS II in 1960.  Both conferences produced very little consensus and 
were considered unsuccessful. 
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States followed suit but laid claims much more than what was asserted by the United States.”  
Problematically for the developing world, Coquia wrote that for the next four decades, “the 
States that could not exploit [deep sea resources] due to lack of technological resources needed a 
law to protect them against abuses by exploitation of other States.”41  As pressure to the 
historical status quo mounted and developing countries remained unprotected, the international 
community convened for UNCLOS III in 1973.42   
The first U.S. response to these newfound trends was NSSM 125 issued by President 
Nixon in 1970. The President assigned a newfound importance to the issue of the oceans on the 
basis that “the law of the sea is inadequate to meet the needs of modern technology and the 
concerns of the international community. If it is not modernized multilaterally, unilateral action 
and international conflict are inevitable.”43  A new system was required.  While calling for an 
immediate treaty renouncing all national claims over resources of the seabed beyond 200 meters 
in depth, Nixon announced his vision to establish “international machinery” that would 
“authorize and regulate the exploration and use of seabed resources beyond the continental 
margins.”44  The U.S. sought to hold territorial sea lines through an international agreement, 
rather than simply by continuing to assert its customary rights through the insulation of military 
defense.  U.S. principles sought to ensure the highest levels of free trade and to avoid the 
possibility of nations demanding travel tariffs for passage through important commercial straits.  
In brief, NSSM 125 outlined U.S. national security interests, advocated for the highest level of 
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44 Ibid. See Figure 1. 
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freedom of navigation, defined U.S. economic, environmental, scientific, and conflict resolution 
principles, and finally laid out options for the upcoming negotiations. 
Even before Kissinger became the secretary of state in 1973 he had begun work on LOS 
policy. As National Security Advisor, he sent a memo on July 22, 1971, to President Nixon 
analyzing NSSM 125 with a section titled, “My Views.”  Kissinger stated that the he believed 
“the most important question facing us at this time is how to generate broad multilateral support 
for a law of the sea which protects those aspects of our positions which are vital to us, namely a 
12-mile territorial sea and free transit through straits,” in order to maintain the greatest freedom 
of navigation possible.45  One of the most important issues that continued to be negotiated was 
the U.S. seabeds initiative, which was originally based on the shape of the continental shelf but 
deemed unfair by Kissinger.  Instead, the negotiating delegation (and thus the S/P) were given 
the authority to explore a different formula for the outer limit of the so-called “trusteeship zone” 
and the profit sharing by developing nations that it entailed.46  The major analyses initiated by 
Kissinger’s 1971 memo would be “a study of what we can do through carrots and sticks to 
persuade individual countries to take more accommodating L.O.S. positions,” combined with a 
high level diplomatic campaign designed to seek multilateral support and avoid unilateral 
claims.47  It was from this base laid by Kissinger that the S/P took over in 1973.  
Although discussion of U.S. LOS policy was underway in 1970 and continued throughout 
both Lord’s and Kissinger’s tenures, it would take until 1982 for the negotiation teams to nail 
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down a final agreement on the entire LOS treaty.48  This delay illustrates some of the limitations 
of the S/P as an institution as well as the restraints of grand strategic foreign policy planning.  
There is inherent difficulty associated with negotiations requiring international cooperation over 
shared resources.  As Kissinger noted, the LOS negotiations were extremely important and 
highly complex.  Additionally, bureaucratic timelines and term limits can further inhibit the 
ability of an S/P or State Department to engage in long-term planning.  Although the S/P’s 
mandate was long-term foreign policy, its effectiveness, particularly in the LOS negotiations, 
was often in the tackling of day-to-day problems within a long-term framework.  In the words of 
Dean Acheson, they looked “beyond the vision of the operating officers caught in the smoke and 
crises of current battle; far enough ahead to see the emerging form of things to come and outline 
what should be done to meet or anticipate them.”49  This necessitated daily and weekly changes 
of strategy all while working towards the grander U.S. principles of freedom of navigation and 
limiting regulation power of other nations.  
 
Preparation for the 1974 Caracas Meeting of the UNCLOS III 
 
 After Kissinger became secretary of state in 1973, the direction of U.S. LOS negotiations 
fell on Ambassador John R. Stevenson, the President’s Special Representative for the Law of the 
Sea Negotiations, John Norton Moore, the Chairman of the NSC Interagency Task Force on 
LOS, and Lord.  From the beginning, the S/P recognized its role as a coordinator between 
agencies and on the bureaucratic and political problems of the LOS negotiations.  In a November 
27, 1973, briefing memorandum, Lord outlined the initial disputes on the U.S. side, which 
inhibited progress towards a realistic and comprehensive negotiating position:  
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Strong disagreement is apparent between the agencies, particularly between Treasury (Secretary Schultz) 
and Interior. OMB [Office of Management and Budget] (Director Ash) and CEA [Council of Economic 
Advisors] generally have sided with Treasury, while most of the other agencies share the views of Interior.  
This disagreement focuses on the nature of the international control over the exploitation of seabed 
resources.50 
 
Most nations preferred a strong international seabed regime covering waters beyond 200 miles 
and exclusive coastal state economic jurisdictions over mineral and living resources to 200 miles, 
along with royalties on seabed minerals.51  This engendered opposition towards the U.S. support 
for non-exclusive coastal state economic claims, limited royalties, and a weak regulating body, 
which was viewed as the most conservative of any participant. At this point in 1973, the U.S. 
recognized that they were in a minority position internationally and needed multilateral support.  
This would require willingness to compromise on non-vital interests moving into the Caracas 
Conference in 1974. 
 The Caracas Conference of 1974 represented a moment of excitement in the international 
community.  However, this was short lived.  Gary H. Knight, American LOS expert and member 
of the NSC’s Inter-Agency Task Force on the LOS, wrote that “disillusionment was quick in 
coming, and the conference was, as ocean law expert William T. Burke puts it ‘about as exciting 
as watching paint dry.’”52  As a firsthand U.S. observer, Knight concluded that it was not 
surprising no agreements were reached in Caracas, given the level of disagreement between the 
developed and developing nations.  More problematically, according to Knight “the Caracas 
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session did not bring the parties any closer together.”53  Both Knight and the S/P identified this 
divide as a defining characteristic of the Caracas Conference, and perhaps the entirety of the 
LOS negotiations: “East-West ideological issues were replaced by a new polarization – the 
‘North-South split.’  The nations of the North (Eastern and Western Europe, the Soviet Union, 
the United States, Canada, Japan, and Australia) have common views on most of the issues… 
The nations of the South (the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America) likewise 
have similar perspectives.”  More specifically, the North emphasized freedoms: freedom of 
navigation, freedom of scientific research, freedom from pollution of the marine environment.  
The South emphasized resources: exclusive access to fish, oil, and gas off their coasts, and 
exclusive management authority and regulation within a broad coastal area.54 
The U.S. believed that an international treaty was necessary to avoid international 
conflict and harm to U.S. interests as nations increasingly asserted unilateral claims to more 
ocean area.  These considerations reflected Lord’s bureaucratic proclivities displayed throughout 
his career, but explicitly stated in a 1974 speech to the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco:  
The time of easy choices for this nation is gone.  Accustomed to relative self-sufficiency, we now face the 
reality which has confronted Europe, Japan and most other nations for decades – dependence on an open, 
cooperative international system for national growth.  America must reconcile its national and global 
goals.55         
 
The reconciliation of national and global goals would prove to be both an essential criteria and 
barrier to the negotiations.  This translated into subsequent negotiating strategy as the U.S. 
sought to achieve a settlement of existing and potential conflict over ocean uses through a 




55 Address by Winston Lord, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, “America’s Purpose in an Ambiguous Age,” 
Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, October 11, 1974, Box 350, S/P Files of Winston Lord: Record Group 59 
Entry A1-5027, National Archives II, College Park, MD. Emphasis Added. 
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countries.56  After the 1974 Caracas conference, U.S. strategy shifted.  The U.S. agreed to greater 
coastal state control over offshore resources in order to appease coastal states.  However, these 
concessions were contingent upon reservation of traditional international rights within the areas 
subject to coastal state jurisdiction.  In effect, the U.S. sought to establish a balance between 
coastal states’ demand for increased rights and the international community’s rights regarding 
navigation, scientific research, and other non-resource uses.57   
Given the relatively unsuccessful nature of the 1974 Caracas session, it is unsurprising 
that the U.S. Senate and other states began to look favorably on unilateral extension of 
jurisdiction, which the S/P recognized would negatively affect their ability to conduct 
negotiations.  The S/P and LOS negotiators stood at odds with the will of Congress.  As such, 
subsequent negotiating objectives focused as much on international negotiation as they did on 
domestic concerns.  The S/P LOS issue paper from 1974 concluded by laying out options for all 
treaty sections, and summarized that in preparation for the 1975 session, “we should continue to 
oppose the unilateral 200-mile fisheries bill and the unilateral Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Bill in 
the U.S. Congress and we will work closely with Congress to gain maximum support for an 
acceptable treaty.”58  The S/P understood where Congressional opinion lay, but determined that 
it did not align with long-term U.S. principles.  
 Throughout this period, LOS negotiations became more and more of a priority within the 
State Department and within the S/P.  However, it is worth noting that until 1975, all LOS-
related memos from Lord were directed not to Secretary Kissinger, but to Robert Ingersoll, the 
deputy secretary.  It would take two full years from the first LOS conference in 1973 until late 
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1975 for Secretary Kissinger to take personal notice and until late 1976 before Secretary 
Kissinger took a lead role in negotiations.  Following the failed Caracas conference in 1974, the 
S/P conducted an analytical staff meeting (without Secretary Kissinger present) in order to focus 
on three objectives: 1) U.S. security and straits objectives; 2) the deep seabed regime; and 3) the 
outstanding issues of the economic zone, i.e. 200-mile exclusive economic zone versus a 
“trusteeship zone.”  The S/P’s goal was to set objectives and priorities for the negotiations, 
which would prove to be a primary role throughout the negotiations.59   
 
Secretary Kissinger and the Law of the Sea Conference: 1976 New York Session 
“The current negotiation may thus be the world’s last chance.” 60  -Henry Kissinger, 1975 
 
 
 In advance of the March 1976 session in New York, Secretary Kissinger took a more role 
in the LOS negotiations, in his own words, to “promote significant and rapid progress in this 
vitally important negotiation.”61  His participation began on August 11, 1975, with a speech in 
front of the American Bar Association’s annual convention elevating the importance of the LOS 
conference within his overarching framework for foreign policy, which focused on international 
order and stability.  Discussions within the S/P and the subsequent speeches focused heavily on 
the geopolitical magnitude of the LOS negotiations.  This speech—like many to follow—
featured nearly identical language to the S/P memo from September 10, 1974, reflecting the 
S/P’s influence in defining U.S. LOS principles.  
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In 1974 and 1975, public remarks by both Lord and Kissinger reflected similar thought 
processes about the state of world affairs as one of unprecedented interdependence.  Lord 
advocated for multilateral solutions.  Kissinger focused more heavily on international law and 
global order:  “An international order can be neither stable nor just without accepted norms of 
conduct.  International law both provides a means and embodies our ends… The challenge of 
international order takes an unprecedented urgency in the contemporary world of 
interdependence.”62  With this in mind, Kissinger’s 1975 speech in Montreal reasserted U.S. 
commitment to freedom of navigation through international straits on the basis of free trade and 
international security, while conceding a 12-mile territorial sea, and maintaining U.S. opposition 
to the non-discriminate 200-mile exclusive economic zone.  Kissinger opposed all domestic steps 
towards unilateral legislation on the basis that the “world simply cannot afford to let the vital 
questions before the Law of the Sea conference be answered by default,” and further elevated the 
importance of the LOS negotiations using almost identical rhetoric to the September 1974 S/P 
memo: “We are at one of those rare moments when mankind has come together to devise means 
of preventing future conflict and shaping its destiny, rather than to solve a crisis that has 
occurred to deal with the aftermath of war.  It is a test of vision and will, and of statesmanship. It 
must succeed.”63  By lending his stature and grand strategic rhetoric to the LOS negotiations, 
Kissinger successfully inspired greater cooperation of negotiating parties in advance of the 1976 
Conference in New York.64 
 The S/P continued to strategically use Secretary Kissinger’s participation in the LOS 








participation at the next 1976 LOS Conference in New York.65  Deep seabed mining, a fraught 
issue area, would be the focus in New York, but the outlook was promising; many developing 
countries were making proposals that hinted at willingness to compromise.  As such, Lord 
suggested that Kissinger’s continued participation at the conference “would be underlining the 
political importance the US attaches to these negotiations… to establish common ground 
between the two groups [developed and less developed nations].”66  Over the next few months, 
the S/P prepared Kissinger’s remarks, while simultaneously evaluating Congress’ recent passage 
of the “200-mile unilateral fisheries bill,” opposed by the State Department for its potential 
negative effects on foreign policy and the U.S. negotiating position.67  The proposed speech as of 
mid-March 1976 touched on the importance of interdependence, outlined major U.S. demands 
including a 12-mile territorial sea, a 200-mile economic zone with freedom of navigation, 
freedom of navigation through international straits, the protection of the marine environment, 
and provided a preview of the U.S. negotiating position on deep seabed mining.68 
In consultation with the lead negotiator of the LOS negotiations, Ambassador Learson, 
the S/P continued to take the lead on formulating U.S. negotiating strategy.  The long-term 
analysis and historical knowledge of international relations housed within the S/P made it a 
perfect body for such analysis.  Lord asserted that the U.S. negotiation strategy before 
Kissinger’s speech “would be to obtain early in the session a wider consensus for the 
compromise package.  We would specifically ask one of the two key LDC countries, probably 
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Brazil…whether they would publicly come forward and agree on the broad outlines of the 
package if it had your active personal support.”  Similarly, throughout the LOS negotiations Lord 
displayed his aptitude for evaluating Congressional and public support on behalf of Kissinger: 
“We could also discuss the package with appropriate Hill leaders to obtain their support and 
understanding.  Also we could take soundings with industry leaders to urge their support…to 
help undercut the possible opposition by some agencies.”69  In the days leading up to Secretary 
Kissinger’s speech, the S/P focused their efforts on this tension. 
 Although the S/P served primarily as a long-term planning body, the pace at which the 
LOS negotiations moved and changed required a different type of role.  The S/P essentially 
defined for Secretary Kissinger his participation in the process he deemed to be so vital to 
international world order.  As an example, Secretary Kissinger’s major participatory moment in 
the conference came in the form of an April 8, 1976, speech in New York.  However, U.S. policy 
was set just two weeks prior on March 22, 1976.  The S/P sent a LOS strategy paper outlining 
long-term U.S. interests and the negotiating strategies recommended to secure these interests in 
the day-to-day LOS negotiations.  The S/P continued to direct negotiating policy, which is a day-
to-day endeavor, in order to advance long-term strategic goals as presented in Kissinger’s public 
addresses—the more typical role of the S/P.       
In the 1976 strategy paper, Lord advocated for compromise: both North-South 
cooperation between industrialized and the less developed countries and also between the State 
and Treasury Department.  For North-South cooperation, Lord highlighted that the issue of deep 
seabed mining and the establishment of a governing regime to ensure revenue sharing, which had 
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become a part of the LDCs’ conception of a “new economic order.”70  For the conflict with 
Treasury, described by both Harvard negotiation expert James Sebenius and by Lord, Treasury 
did not want to accept any kind of limitations on U.S. production or exploitation of deep sea 
resources, which the S/P had deemed acceptable as part of the compromise package.71 To 
address both of these facts, and to gain Kissinger’s buy-in, Lord asserted that compromise with 
the less developed countries (LDCs) was inevitable, and allowed for certain concessions backed 
by guarantees in return.  These included guaranteed access to seabed resources for LDCs in 
exchange for some developed country control over the policy machinery of the to-be-established 
International Seabed Regulation Authority (ISRA), limitation of ISRA’s powers, and 
establishment of a dispute settlement procedure. In Lord’s analysis these concessions and 
guarantees satisfied “our basic objectives, but frankly [do] not give us everything we want on 
every issue.”72  However, the S/P concluded that this was the best U.S. could do while still 
securing the necessary conditions for effective access to seabed minerals and the protection of 
military and security interests. 
 With these inter-agency problems in mind, Lord and the S/P spent the next two weeks 
trying to serve as the State Department’s “honest broker,” finding compromise and cooperation 
between the S/P, Treasury, and the LOS Delegation in New York.  The State Department needed 
Kissinger’s April 8 speech to present a united front to move the conference forward on the 
seabeds issue rather than creating more confusion.  Just four days before the speech, the S/P had 
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resolved two of the four major issues; they found agreement for support of a voting system 
within ISRA that reflected relative economic importance and determined that the U.S. would not 
support an adjustment assistance program to help adversely affected land-based producers 
financed by direct national contributions.  However, the limitation of deep-sea mineral 
production and the role of ISRA in possible deep-sea commodity agreements still remained 
contentious with Treasury.   
In a minor setback, a follow-up memo sent the next day on April 5, informed Kissinger 
that the LOS Delegation and Ambassador Learson were forced out of necessity to undertake an 
ad referendum negotiation and accepted a version of the production limitation and role for 
possible future commodity agreements on their own, which went beyond what was contemplated 
by the S/P, despite the S/P’s clear instruction to the delegation to hold the line.73  Strategy had to 
change quickly.  Again, it was the S/P that designed the State Department’s policy towards this 
new development.  The new compromise plan proposed by the S/P allowed for these concessions 
made by Ambassador Learson while maintaining “non-discriminatory access to the area under 
the so-called ‘banking system,’” contingent on a satisfactory ISRA Executive Council being 
formed.  These new policies directly became Kissinger’s talking points.74 
 Three days later on April 8, 1976, it was the day of Kissinger’s LOS Conference address 
titled “The Law of the Sea: A Test of International Cooperation.”  Organized almost identically 
to the S/P strategy paper from March 22, the speech touched on the importance of the oceans, the 
progress of the LOS negotiations to date, and outlined a range of unresolved issues and U.S. 
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solutions.  For marine scientific research the U.S. agreed to a reasonable balance between coastal 
state and international interests in the economic zone (up to 200 miles, as can be seen in Figure 1 
in the Appendix).  In terms of a dispute settlement mechanism, the U.S. proposed the 
establishment of an impartial body whose findings would be binding on all signatory states in 
order to have a non-political, rapid, and impartial judge.  Finally, in respect to the “most complex 
and vital issue remaining,”—deep seabeds—the U.S. voiced support for the establishment of an 
International Seabed Resource Authority (ISRA) with limited jurisdiction and an executive 
council to represent the “producer and consumer interests of those states most concerned with 
seabed mining,” non-discriminatory access for states and their nationals to deep seabed 
resources, support for a system of revenue sharing (a top-priority LDC demand), and, to address 
the major LDC concern, technology transfer system for developing countries to share deep 
seabed mining technology.75   
Lord concluded Kissinger’s speech in typical Kissinger fashion by elevating the 
importance of the LOS negotiations to that of utmost geopolitical importance: “If the Conference 
is successful, mankind’s rights and responsibilities with regard to the oceans will be clear to 
all…it will mean the nations of the world have proved that the challenges of the future can be 
solved cooperatively; that, for the first time mankind has been able to surmount traditional 
enmities and ambitions in the service of a better vision.”76  While reiterating his hope for a 
successful April Conference, Kissinger may have foreshadowed its subsequent failure by 
announcing that if a second session is necessary this year that the president asked him to lead the 
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U.S. delegation himself.  Now, in 1976, the President himself adopted the preferred tactic of the 
S/P, to use Kissinger’s participation as a tool on the international negotiating stage. 
 Although the LOS negotiations would not produce a final treaty until December 10, 
1982, in Montego Bay, Jamaica, the contributions of the S/P towards negotiating strategy and 
defining Kissinger’s participation were a major influence for the 1982 treaty.  Given the 
unsuccessful outcome of the 1976 conference, Lord wrote a statement on behalf of Kissinger that 
reiterated the work left to be done on the regime for mining deep seabed minerals, the nature of 
the “economic zone,” provisions for marine scientific research in the economic zone, and the 
rights of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states in the economic zone.77  However, 
the eventual treaty (although rejected by President Ronald Reagan because of its bias towards 
principles of the developing world’s “new international economic order”) represented a success 
for the S/P and for Kissinger’s grand strategy, even after both had left office.  The treaty 
included many policies originally designed by Lord’s S/P and subsequently announced by 
Kissinger in his various addresses.78  The 1982 LOS Treaty called for technology transfers and 
wealth transfers from developed to underdeveloped nations; it required signatories to adopt 
regulations and laws to control pollution of the marine environment; and established a 12-mile 
territorial sea limit and a 200-mile exclusive economic zone limit.  Finally, the treaty established 
the International Seabed Authority, which included a Council based on relative economic 
power.79  The principles defined between 1973 and 1976 formed the basis of U.S. participation in 
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the 1982 treaty and thus the S/P succeeded in shaping U.S. policy and the global treaty through 
Kissinger’s participation in UNCLOS III. 
Given the similarities from S/P memo to major Kissinger speech, lack of analytical staff 
meetings between the S/P and Kissinger, and Kissinger’s limited consultations with the Treasury 
Department or Department of Defense leading up to his participation in the 1976 New York LOS 
Conference it is clear that he placed a great deal of responsibility on Lord and the S/P to be the 
main body within the State Department for LOS policy formulation.  To highlight the ultimate 
decision-making power exercised by the S/P it is critical to emphasize some of the most 
important similarities between Kissinger’s April 8th speech and the S/P memos leading up to it. 
Kissinger adopted the S/P view that a stalemate at UNCLOS III represented a worst-case 
scenario for all parties; all policy proposals related to the deep sea mining regime and the 
establishment of the ISRA came straight from the March 4th Strategy memo prepared by the S/P; 
and, perhaps most importantly, Kissinger’s ultimatums insinuating unilateral U.S. mining in the 
face of stalemate originated from S/P analysis that other nations were growing impatient and 
could force the U.S.’s hand through their own unilateral claims.80 
The S/P’s effectiveness can be attributed to a few reasons.  As suggested by Lord and 
scholars like Brady, one reason was the inter-agency nature of the LOS negotiations; LOS 
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negotiations represented a functional issue, rather than a regional one.81  Lord and the S/P 
negotiated day-to-day strategy while framing and solving problems within the context of a 
grander framework for geopolitical stability.82  Finally, the lack of meaningful historical U.S. 
engagement with the UNCLOS allowed the S/P to form policy from the ground up.  In this new 
issue area, in which Secretary Kissinger voluntarily played a passive if important role, U.S. LOS 
policy and negotiation strategy came directly from the pens of Lord and his S/P. 
 
IV. Human Rights in Southern Africa and Secretary Kissinger’s 1976 Lusaka, Zambia 
Speech: A Liberal Cause Turned Operational Policy 
 
It would not have been predicted by any observer of American politics that a Republican 
administration would take the lead in bringing about the breakthrough to majority rule in 
Southern Africa. Majority [black] rule had been a liberal cause, never translated into an 
operational policy.83  
-Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal 
 
The complexity and extended timeline of the LOS negotiations limited the overall impact 
that Lord’s S/P could exert on the final treaty process.  Although they were able to shape day-to-
day negotiating strategy within the larger framework of long-term U.S. interests, given that the 
treaty would not be finalized until 1982, it is difficult to attribute full credit to Lord’s S/P for the 
treaty’s success.  However, the change in U.S. human rights policy towards southern Africa 
provides an example of the S/P successfully shaping U.S. foreign policy to reflect their own 
internal analysis, which differed from the opinions of Secretary Kissinger.  Kissinger’s April 27, 
1976, speech in Lusaka, Zaire represented a clear declaration that U.S. policy towards human 
rights in Africa had changed forever and that the S/P successfully influenced Kissinger’s 
decision-making.  
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In a short two years, from 1974 to 1976, Kissinger and the State Department shifted from 
a moderately ambivalent and uninterested attitude towards human rights in southern Africa to 
markedly more active and explicit promotion of black majority rule in South Africa and 
Rhodesia.  Until this point, the U.S. operated under a Nixon administration policy insensitively 
referred to as the “Tar Baby option.” 84  A secret Nixon Administration document outlined the 
policy: “we would maintain public opposition to racial repression but relax political isolation and 
economic restrictions on the white [ruled] states.”85  In line with this, Kissinger sought to 
maintain geopolitical stability by supporting the status quo in Africa.86  Almost twenty-five years 
after the fact, Kissinger admitted in Years of Renewal, the drastic change in U.S. policy from the 
“Tar Baby option” to the Lusaka speech was an unusual evolution of policy because it 
represented a relative 180-degree turn towards Africa, specifically Rhodesia. 
 As early as 1974, the U.S. began facing increased pressure from Congress, the American 
public, and international actors alike to address human rights abuses of allies worldwide as well 
as to clarify U.S. policy towards Africa.  Congress began its campaign by demanding reduced 
economic and military aid to nations with visibly bad human rights records.  Similarly, Francis 
Kornegay in a 1985 piece for Africa Report summed up public opinion of Kissinger’s Africa 
policy as an “admitted ‘non-policy’ towards Africa,” making reference to Kissinger’s admission 
to the Congressional Black Caucus that he had no Africa policy at all.87  Relatedly, on April 19, 
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1975, (ironically, just a year before Kissinger would speak in Lusaka, Zambia on Kaunda’s 
invitation) President Kenneth D. Kaunda of Zambia stated that, “what gives Zambia and Africa 
great cause for concern is America’s policy towards Africa, or is it the lack of it?”88  Kaunda was 
correct.  An S/P memo from 1975, ranked South Africa as a third tier priority in a ranked matrix 
of political/security interest to the United States, less important than Australia, India, or 
Algeria.89  Historian Thomas Borstelmann offers an explanation: “[Nixon’s and Kissinger’s] 
focus on powerful nations and their lack of interest in weaker ones meant that Africa would 
always rank low in their priorities,” but for the same reasons it meant that as the only 
industrialized state on the continent with a modern military force that South Africa would get 
special attention.90  While it could be argued the growing discontent of Congress, the American 
public, and presidents like Kenneth Kaunda caused Kissinger’s shift in ideology, this was not 
entirely the case.91   
Throughout this period of heavy criticism, Secretary Kissinger displayed an unwavering 
public preference for non-interference, a desire to block Congressional imposition on foreign 
policy, and at times a willingness to ignore outside opinion completely.  Secretary Kissinger 
outlined his general view on human rights issues in his first discussion on the topic with eight 
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members of Congress on December 17, 1974, organized by the heavily human rights-focused 
democratic Congressman Donald Fraser:  
Some countries in certain circumstances must be supported no matter how unpleasant it might seem… In 
determining values we must first define our terms. American institutions cannot be automatically translated 
and made meaningful to every country in the world…We try to take human rights issues into consideration 
as long as they do not interfere with our national security.92 
 
Again in 1975, when speaking to the authoritarian Chilean Prime Minister, Kissinger infamously 
stated: “I hold the strong view that human rights are not appropriate in a foreign policy 
context.”93  Furthermore, Keys attests to Kissinger’s uncompromising ideology on human rights 
internationally: “despite recommendations from key advisers to meet Congress halfway or to 
make an effort to appear cooperative, Kissinger repeatedly torpedoed efforts at even the most 
minimal accommodation.”  However, she alludes to the influence that Winston Lord and the S/P 
would play over the next two years in this arena:  
Yet, despite Kissinger’s dogged efforts to undermine it…the Bureau during his tenure performed an 
important educative function, inculcating a new mindset, establishing new diplomatic precedents and 
procedures, and setting in motion the process through which human rights became a normal part of foreign 
policy considerations.94 
 
Given the indifference felt towards the region, particularly in terms of human rights issues, the 
evolution of U.S. policy towards Africa and specifically southern Africa provides an example of 
the S/P’s success against Kissinger’s “dogged efforts,” to keep human rights out of U.S. foreign 
policy. 
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 Explanations for Kissinger’s shifted position on human rights in Rhodesia and South 
Africa remain mixed.  Many historians argue a deterministic narrative for Kissinger’s shift.   
Historian Hanes Walton Jr. writes that, “Kissinger policy didn’t just change itself; events and the 
role of African nation-states led, in part, to the evolution of a shift in the role that Kissinger had 
defined for African nation-states.” 95  Jeremi Suri posits that human rights were part of 
Kissinger’s realpolitik but only as a means to achieve international stability, and only in the 
European context.96  Historians like Alex Thomson and Borstelmann attribute Kissinger’s shift 
to Portugal’s retreat from Angola: “The anti-Communist white-ruled states were now down to 
two – South Africa and Rhodesia,” which led Kissinger to fear the fall of Rhodesia to the Soviets 
and to the realization that ‘“what is required, then…is a preemptive strategy” to take the 
momentum away from the Soviets and Cubans.”’97  While some of the shift must be attributed to 
events on the continent like the Portuguese retreat from Angola and increased pressure on the 
few white settler states left in Africa, this explanation discount the S/P’s role in reaching the 
Lusaka speech and the policies it announced, instead attributing the switch entirely to 
necessity.98  Despite these events, Nixon and Kissinger generally continued their policy of 
opposition towards systems based on racial discrimination while refusing to “put more than a 
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token element of Washington’s power behind eliminating them.”99  Through declassified State 
Department documents and conversation transcripts, it is clear that the personal ideology of Lord 
and S/P analysis from 1974 to 1976 played a critical role in convincing Kissinger to pay more 
attention to human rights in Rhodesia and South Africa, outside of the events in Angola. 
Contrary to these deterministic explanations, as early as 1974, before Portugal’s retreat 
from Angola, the S/P understood that there were questions “about the adequacy of our machinery 
for dealing with [human rights problems],” as well as “the need for a more coordinated approach 
to policy-making on these proliferating issues in order to make sure that what we do in one area 
does not contradict or undermine what we are trying to do.”100  In response, the S/P took the lead 
for the State Department and conducted an analytical staff meeting followed by a comprehensive 
S/P study on human rights issues written on October 22, 1974.101  It was the S/P that first 
demonstrated an understanding that the widespread criticism of human rights policy and lack of 
policy towards Africa necessitated change.  Through a combination of Kissinger’s desire for 
international stability, pressure from Congress following the Angola crisis, and most importantly, 
S/P analysis and prodding, Kissinger drastically would drastically change his calculus. 
 
Understanding Lord’s Motivations 
“Leaders must grasp the basic forces at work in the world and impart this vision to their 
peoples.  The public does not expect instant solution.  But it must be confident that the problems 
are understood and that they are being addressed.” 102  
-Winston Lord 
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 As early as 1974, the S/P took the lead on human rights issues as early as 1974, drafting 
the 30-page analytical study titled “U.S. Policies on Human Rights and Authoritarian Regimes.” 
This document was circulated to Kissinger multiple times over the two-year period from both 
Lord and through Deputy Secretary Bob Ingersoll who advocated for it to be disseminated to the 
field.103  Nevertheless, it took until July 7th, 1975, before Kissinger agreed to take action, signing 
his initials to authorize an analytical staff meeting on the issue of human rights.104  At the time of 
its release, the document advocated vaguely for, “a coherent definition of our [U.S.] world 
posture on human rights as part of our overall foreign policy along with a realistic flexibility in 
the application of that posture to a variety of situations and contexts,” and provided four policy 
options ranging from a passive policy to a major new human rights initiative.105  Given the S/P’s 
early response, it is instructive to examine some of the personal influences on Lord to explain his 
commitment to changing Kissinger’s mind.   
On July 3, 1975, Lord received a dissent channel memo from Alison Palmer, an African 
foreign service officer, who criticized the State Department’s ad hoc handling of sanctions 
violations particularly for African violators.  In the memo, Palmer claimed that violations about 
sanctions were being ignored.  She urged the State Department to immediately increase 
discussion of human rights, in particular the “human suffering experienced by blacks in 
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Rhodesia,” and despite the inevitable pushback she must have anticipated, lamented, “I know full 
well that the very words ‘moral and humanitarian’ are taboo in our foreign policy decision-
making process today.  This saddens me.”106  Lord responded positively, but revealed his 
heightened commitment to human rights: “I have one quarrel with your memorandum – your 
allegation/assumption that ‘the very words “moral and humanitarian” are taboo in our foreign 
policy decision-making process today.’ I respectfully disagree.”107  Exemplifying his desire to 
engage the issue area, Lord chose to respond to Palmer’s critique, as he felt morality and 
humanitarianism were a major thrust of the S/P’s analysis.  Despite his response, there is still the 
question of why Lord would have advocated for black majority rule in southern Africa in a time 
when Kissinger was so opposed to the idea, outside of his desire to achieve public and 
Congressional support for foreign policy. 
 One could point to Lord’s early rejection of apartheid in an October 1974 memo where 
he asserted the U.S. should “speak or act on other countries’ domestic issues only in serious 
cases such as apartheid” or his insistence on holding an analytical staff meeting with Secretary 
Kissinger to discuss the very same S/P memo as proof of Lord’s support for incorporating human 
rights into diplomacy.108  However, neither of these things would necessarily explain his 
personal motivations.  It was a combination of Lord’s forward-looking mandate, belief in 
relationships, and understanding of the importance of buy-in from Congress and the American 
public that convinced him that U.S. human rights policy, particularly towards Rhodesia and 
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South Africa, had to change.109  Lord was keenly aware of the importance of relationships in his 
role as director of the S/P: those between bureaus, with his own staff, and with Secretary 
Kissinger.  He focused much more time on these relationships than Kissinger.  Revealing this 
contrast, Lord remarked that, “on human rights generally, [Kissinger] never had a full 
appreciation of the need for public and Congressional support…In many ways he was more 
comfortable dealing with authoritarian leaders who could make decisions than in dealing with 
messy democrats and parliaments.”110  Similarly, Lord was adept at managing relationships 
between bureaus in the State Department; he spoke at length in his oral history about mediating 
the concerns of the different bureaus and helping to shape their memos in a manner that would 
appeal to Kissinger in order to achieve their original aims.  This belief permeated his work.  In 
relation to the African question, Lord foreshadowed the challenge before him when he asserted 
that, “the highest priority this year [1976] is to broaden public understanding and support for our 
policies” in a memo meant to brief Kissinger on all pertinent problems the State Department 
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faced in 1976111  At the helm of the S/P, Lord served as the mediator between bureaus and a 
conduit between the shifting Congressional and public opinion towards U.S. human rights policy 
and Kissinger himself throughout the 1970s.  
 
Action, Bureaucracy, and Influence from Lord and the S/P 
“An emphasis on humanitarian elements alone was not apt to sway Kissinger.”112 
 
In his oral history, Lord described the mechanisms by which he translated his support for 
a shift in U.S. policy towards Africa into real influence on Kissinger. Lord described his early 
attempts by saying he “tried to make the case, somewhat naively with Kissinger frankly, that in 
addition to geopolitical reasons we should do some shifting of our policy towards South Africa, 
we owed it to our domestic audience.”113  In the case of the African question, Lord believed that 
policy toward southern Africa should change but he urged the African Bureau to stress “the 
geopolitical advantages of changing our African policy. Namely, in competing for influence in 
Africa with the Russians” rather than base their memo on the moral imperative.114  In this case, 
Lord shared with the African Bureau a desire to back black Africans’ “aspirations for justice and 
equality – out of principle and to elevate our standing on the continent,” but through his 
knowledge of Kissinger, Lord knew the Bureau must highlight the geopolitical advantages of this 
approach in their appeal because “an emphasis on humanitarian elements alone was not apt to 
sway Kissinger… he is a balance of power realpolitik type, and isn’t overly preoccupied with 
human rights and so on.”115  Yet, despite the ease with which Lord describes this task in his oral 
																																																								
111 Winston Lord, Director of Policy Planning, to Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State, Action Memorandum, 
“Prospects for 1976,” February 4, 1976, S/P Files of Winston Lord: Record Group 59 Entry A1-5027, National 
Archives II, College Park, MD. 
112 Kennedy and Tucker, Interview with Winston Lord, 359. 
113 Ibid, 76. 
114 Ibid, 324. 
115 Interview with Winston Lord, conducted June 27, 2017 via telephone; Kennedy and Tucker, Interview 
 38 
history two decades after the fact, this was a methodical and bureaucratic process that took place 
between the S/P and Kissinger throughout 1974 and 1975 culminating in the 1976 Lusaka 
speech. 
 Moving chronologically through Lord’s oral history and correspondences, it is possible to 
trace the S/P’s increased pressure and influence on Kissinger’s calculus towards southern Africa.  
In 1975, the State Department’s battle with Congress over linking security assistance to human 
rights came to a head with the introduction of Senator Fraser’s Human Rights Reports in the 
newly amended Section 502B of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, which called for cutting off 
security assistance to countries that engaged in gross violations of human rights.  Under no 
circumstance did Kissinger support the limitation of his foreign policy tools or the encroachment 
of Congress on his decision-making.116   However, Lord and the S/P advocated for a more 
cooperative approach to Congress.   
In a September 20, 1975, memorandum titled “Security Assistance and the Human Rights 
Report to the Congress,” Lord pushed back against Kissinger calling for his “urgent attention,” a 
marked change in rhetoric as it pertained to human rights memorandums of early 1974 and 1975.  
Lord first appealed to Kissinger on the basis of their relationship and shared sensibilities, 
“personally, as you know, I have long shared your skepticism that withholding security 
assistance is a useful lever for improving human rights situations in recipient countries…And I 
doubt equally the wisdom of setting our feet upon a slippery slope by judging the human rights 
performance of countries around the world.” 117  However, Lord challenged the accepted opinion 
of Kissinger with a subsequent warning: “We are faced with a law about whose intent its 
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supporters are very clear. If we ignore the spirit of this law we may well pay a substantial price.”  
The S/P advocated for compromise by reducing security assistance levels to a few countries with 
visibly bad human rights situations in order to convince Congress that “that they should not and 
need not” take human rights considerations into account on behalf of the State Department.118  In 
her account, Keys criticizes Kissinger’s unfaltering rejection of tying aid to human rights, while 
commending Lord and the S/P for their significant opposition and persistent attempts to change 
Kissinger’s mind in the best interest of the State Department.119 
 In addition to its vocal opposition, in late 1975, the S/P began employing the strategy 
Lord outlined in his oral history by posing problems within Kissinger’s frameworks, namely the 
geopolitical North-South Cold War.  In a November 14, 1975, memorandum meant to aid 
Kissinger in the forthcoming November 18 U.N. debate on apartheid, the S/P explained that 
“South Africa’s unwillingness to deviate from the basics of its radical policy will continue to 
bedevil our relations with many African countries…[who] view our opposition to sanctions 
against South Africa as a form of cooperation with the SAG [South African government] and at 
least tacit acceptance of apartheid.”120  Of greater strategic importance though, the S/P asserted 
that continued silence on apartheid and unchanged U.S. policy “has the effect of undermining 
support for our positions on a variety of issues in international forums, impeding our relations 
with black African states, and presenting opportunities for exploitation by the Soviet Union and 
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During this time period, while Kissinger did offer support for the forces of majority rule 
in Rhodesia, his weak statements were often interpreted as support for maintaining international 
security and thus the existing Smith regime, given his focus on criticizing Soviet and Cuban 
intervention.  In one effective example, after an address on Rhodesia which criticized the Smith 
regime’s impediment of majority rule—but focused heavily on warning the Soviets and Cubans 
about intervening in South Africa—the Rhodesian Defense Minister van der Byl issued a 
statement on March 5, thanking the U.S. for their support.122  While this was not the intended 
meaning, Kissinger was not amenable to more principled and explicitly clear statements for 
black majority rule and against Smith’s white minority regime proposed by Lord and the African 
Bureau.  His response to these international interpretations may speak to his true ideological 
stance at the time. 
Upon recognizing the effect of Kissinger’s vague statement through van der Byl’s 
“thank-you,” Lord and the S/P pushed for a subsequent statement to clarify the U.S. position.  
They proposed that the “statement would go further than what you [Kissinger] previously said, in 
that it states the Smith regime ‘should be under no illusion that the United States will in any way 
assist its efforts to maintain itself in power against the wishes of the majority.’”123  However, 
their appeal to Kissinger did not fit within his framework and overstepped the level of U.S. 
morality he was comfortable speaking publicly about.  The only marks Kissinger made on the 
five-page proposed statement appear below, as a strikethrough on the critical correction intended 
to clarify U.S. criticism of Ian Smith’s white minority government: 
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The United States continues firmly to support the principles of majority rule in Rhodesia and urges the 
regime there to seize what could well be its last opportunity for a peaceful settlement.  The regime should 
be under no illusion that the United States will in any way assist its efforts to maintain itself in power 
against the wishes of the majority.124 
 
As discussed by Keys, Jussi Hanhimäki, Jeremi Suri, and Lord himself, Kissinger refused to 
offer support for the more principled arguments for black majority rule or a shift in U.S. policy 
towards southern Africa on strictly moral grounds.125 
Kissinger’s unwillingness to secede to the moral argument of Lord and the S/P even 
when faced with increasing pressure at home and abroad, led Lord and the S/P to again try a 
new, but familiar, angle two days later in a March 12, 1976, memorandum smartly titled, “The 
Soviets and Southern Africa.”  It began with a critical statement foreshadowing Lord’s new 
tactic: “You may find his approach to the problem a useful alternative optic for dealing with the 
hard choices concerning Africa that are on the table.”126  The alarmist memo was intended to 
catch the attention of Secretary Kissinger.  In his somewhat over-reaching summary, Lord 
warned that “for the first time, the Soviets are in a position to seek a similar polarization in 
Southern Africa (US and whites vs. Soviets and blacks),” and goes on to assert that “the 
implications of such a polarization for the US global position (as well as for domestic US 
opinion) are vastly worse than were those of the Middle East polarization. The equities of the 
situation are much more stark; we would stand virtually alone.”127  Most urgently, Lord 
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concluded: “the avoidance of polarization must be the primary US goal in our Southern African 
policy.... This is all the more urgent since we might not be able to support effectively our 
interests in Southern Africa against a Soviet threat short of risking major US-Soviet 
hostilities.”128  The goal of this racial warning was to play to Kissinger’s focus on countering 
Soviet influence around the globe, by shaping southern Africa into a potential Soviet proxy war. 
This was clearly well received by Kissinger.  An April 9, 1976, memorandum from Lord to 
Kissinger responded to Kissinger’s request promising that Lord would promptly send “an overall 
S/P strategy paper which attempts to tie together the Soviet/Cuban and Southern African strands 
in a comprehensive, geopolitical fashion.”129   In the few weeks between receiving this memo 
and his trip to Africa, this new “alternative optic,” which framed southern Africa as a new U.S.-
Soviet ideological battleground for the Third World by the S/P, trapped Kissinger and would 
ultimately have Lord’s desired effect. 
 Between April 9 and April 21, Kissinger determined the purpose of his Africa trip. He 
would not meet with liberation movement leaders or address the problem of Angolan statehood, 
but set two objectives only: “to emphasize the importance that we [the U.S.] attach to the 
development and economic progress of Africa,” and “to put the United States behind the 
aspirations for majority rule and to begin working out a complete program for achieving it.”  For 
this decision, Kissinger would leave Washington D.C. for his African trip to a chorus of applause 
from thirty-eight African ambassadors.130   
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*** 
In front of a group of regional African leaders assembled by Zambian President Kenneth 
Kaunda in Lusaka, Zambia, Kissinger set in motion a new era of U.S. foreign policy in Africa 
when he declared Smith’s white minority regime and the South African occupation of Namibia 
illegal, explicitly calling for black majority rule.131  In the name of international order and 
stability, Kissinger stated that, “America’s responsibilities as a global power give us a strong 
interest today in the independence, peace, and well-being of this vast continent…For without 
peace, racial justice, and growing prosperity in Africa, we cannot speak of a just international 
order.”  Most importantly, Kissinger made clear the often intentionally vague U.S. position as it 
pertained to black majority rule in southern Africa: 
Here in Lusaka, I reaffirm the unequivocal commitment of the United States to human rights, as expressed 
in the principles of the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We support self-
determination, majority rule, equal rights, and human dignity for all the peoples of southern Africa—in the 
name of moral principle, international law, and world peace.132 
 
Although it is true that these were not new declarations for the U.S., these principles had not 
been stated so explicitly to an African audience.  As Andy DeRoche asserts, Lusaka represented 
a “turning point in the history of US foreign policy” and the official transition of black majority 
rule from a “liberal cause to an operational policy” for the U.S. and Africa.133 
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 The importance of this shift was felt internationally. While response was reserved in 
some facets, audiences believed that this speech signaled a new direction for U.S. Africa policy.  
A July 22, 1976, Kansas City Times article summed up much of the hesitant public opinion 
surrounding the speech: 
The new policy has all the trappings of Kissinger s famous style: The Mid-east “step-by-step” approach, 
shuttle diplomacy, shrouds of secrecy and balance-of-power logic. Against the backdrops of the bloodiest 
uprising in South Africa’s recent history and the obstacles of presidential politics at home, the fine lines of 
the policy have yet to be seen, although the Ford administration strongly backs it, though in a low-profile 
manner.134 
 
In a more emotional show of satisfaction, President Kaunda is reported to have begun crying 
during Kissinger’s speech in Lusaka.  Kaunda admitted that, “some of us were emotionally 
charged when you were speaking. We are fully convinced that statement you have just made 
represents the sentiments of the great majority of the American people… We couldn’t believe 
this was a Secretary of State from Washington.”135  However, the overriding international 
sentiment was cautious.  In actuality, this was not unfounded.   
Kissinger seemed to have realized the importance of his statement in Lusaka after the 
fact.  In a conversation with President Ford on May 21, Kissinger warned that, “if it [black 
majority rule] comes up again, I would say that after Angola, the continent was sliding toward 
Communism, that we have given the whites more time to work things out. Don't make it look 
like I went out to push majority rule. This was the only way we could stop the radicalization 
process.”136  Regardless of Kissinger’s feelings after the speech, Lord’s framing was successful 
in achieving both the S/P’s and African Bureau’s policy objectives.  The Lusaka speech set in 
motion exactly what the Kansas City Times anticipated and the next few years featured multiple 
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shuttles to Africa to negotiate black majority rule and the fall of apartheid in South Africa, a 
contribution often overlooked in Kissinger’s career.   
While the subsequent months of shuttle negotiations proved unsuccessful, this does not 
negate the S/P’s influence on Secretary Kissinger and the drastic shift in U.S. policy towards 
Africa.  As further proof for their dichotomous ideologies towards black majority rule, Lord was 
pleased with the shift in U.S. policy towards South Africa for the same moral reasons as the 
African Bureau, while Secretary Kissinger expressed satisfaction for different reasons even 
twenty-three years after the fact:  
From the geopolitical perspective, we had achieved the purpose of our African diplomacy.  Six months 
after the debacle of Angola, the United States was demonstrating a continuing capacity to shape events in 
Africa… Rhodesia and Namibia became independent, implementing principles and procedures agreed 
during the African shuttles…  International war in South Africa was avoided… and there were to be no 
other Cuban adventures in the independence struggles of South Africa.137 
 
Perhaps most illustrative of the size of, Kissinger’s and thus the S/P’s, accomplishment is that 
Walter Isaacson asserted in his highly critical biography of Kissinger that despite the fact that 
Kissinger’s shuttles did not immediately produce results, “the nations of black Africa, whose 
attitude toward the U.S. had ranged from wariness to hostility, began to trust Washington as a 
force for majority rule. The growing appeal of the Soviet Union was countered.”138 
 In conclusion, the seeds for black majority rule as a stated policy of U.S. foreign policy 
were germinated within the S/P, who from the first signs of Congressional criticism in 1974 took 
the lead on the issue of human rights despite Kissinger’s disregard.  Between 1974 and 
Kissinger’s 1976 speech in Lusaka, Lord pressured Kissinger to conduct analytical staff 
meetings and to read policy studies on the effects of apartheid, the moral reasons to shift policy, 
and the importance of Congressional and public support in a post-Watergate world.  Although 
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unsuccessful for an extended period of time, the S/P realized in early 1976 that they must place 
the concerns and moral suppositions of the African Bureau within the context of a framework 
that appealed to Kissinger: the North-South global Cold War and countering Soviet influence 
worldwide.  This was the bullet that allowed the S/P to move Kissinger from the opinion that 
“Africa was the Africans’ problem” to speaking about America’s moral principle to stand behind 
black majority rule to an audience of African leaders.  While events in Africa and Congressional 
pressure played a role, the State Department’s unexpected 180-degree turn on Africa was greatly 
influenced by the S/P’s forward-looking analysis, complimented by the bureaucratic adeptness of 
its director, Winston Lord. 
 
V. Conclusions: The Influence and Effectiveness of Winston Lord and the S/P 
 This essay has used two case studies to follow the formulation of U.S. foreign policy 
within the State Department to determine the influence of both Director Winston Lord and his 
Policy Planning Staff on Secretary of State Henry Kissinger from 1973 to 1977, often cited as a 
“golden-age for policy planners.”  In many cases, the success of the S/P stemmed from its ability 
to perform long-term foreign policy analysis while fitting recommendations within Kissinger’s 
already established grand strategic frameworks.  Although the S/P often challenged Kissinger’s 
assumptions and formed opinions, some of their most important successes came from operating 
within these frameworks, which prioritized Soviet containment, great power politics, and 
international stability.  In this sense, the S/P from 1973 to 1977, proved to be both effective and 
influential, as Kissinger’s decision-making and speeches often demonstrated a direct link to S/P 
analysis.     
Specifically, the S/P’s utility in the two case studies differed, exemplifying its diverse 
usefulness and mandate afforded under Kissinger.  In the words of Kissinger, the S/P’s role in 
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the LOS negotiations was as “the central coordinator of the efforts of the Department and other 
agencies to evolve policies and tactics.”139  Here, Lord proactively went beyond the S/P mandate.  
The S/P formulated policy but also served as a bureaucratic actor directing all negotiating policy, 
which is inherently a day-to-day endeavor, in order to advance long-term strategic goals—its 
more typical role.  As shown by Kissinger’s 1976 speeches and the eventual treaty, S/P analysis 
directly defined U.S. participation in the UNCLOS III negotiations and 1982 treaty. 
The S/P’s efforts to promote black majority rule in southern Africa, culminating with 
Kissinger’s April 1976 Lusaka speech represented a more drastic watershed moment by which to 
analyze the process of S/P policy analysis.  The S/P transformed the calculus of Secretary 
Kissinger and executed a monumental shift in U.S. foreign policy towards southern Africa.  As 
early as 1974, the S/P began formulating forward-looking policy in response to changing events 
in Africa, as well as pressure from Congress, the American public, and international alike, which 
they determined necessitated policy change.  More importantly, the S/P advocated for their view 
that black majority rule was inevitable and critical in Rhodesia and South Africa despite 
Kissinger’s preference for non-interference and support for regional powers.  Thus, the 1976 
Lusaka speech, announcing a 180-degree-turn on U.S. human rights policy towards southern 
Africa, represented the culmination of both the S/P’s analysis and bureaucratic campaign to 
change Kissinger’s mind. 
The most definitive evidence of the S/P’s influence on Secretary Kissinger may come 
directly from the man himself.  On January 17, 1977, two days before Kissinger’s tenure as 
secretary of state would come to an end he gave a speech to Lord and his staff to present the 
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group with Distinguished Honor Award.140  Kissinger started by affirming the renewed 
importance he placed on the S/P and the significance of Lord’s appointment:  
When I became Secretary I asked Winston to take over the Policy Planning Staff… I believe that over the 
last three decades the Policy Planning Staff had fallen into disuse… I never even knew about the Policy 
Planning Staff at all, and the Policy Planning Staff was considered sort of a long-hair exercise into which 
people were sent because it looked good on organization charts.141 
 
Kissinger addressed the constant State Department struggle to balance operational priorities with 
forward-planning strategic priorities: “the hardest thing for those who have to make the decisions 
is to gain a perspective.  But to gain it in a manner that is compassionate of their problems and 
that can be handled within their framework.”142  This essay has highlighted S/P’s ability to 
navigate this very concept through its framing of the LOS Treaty as a matter of geopolitical 
priority and the question of black majority rule in southern Africa as one that would best ensure 
global stability as well as limit Soviet influence in the Third World. 
In terms of his regard for the S/P’s contributions, Kissinger’s remarks are no less 
celebratory.  He acknowledged the critical role of the S/P on a “whole range of issues, cutting 
across various bureaus and involving individual bureaus,” and conclusively proved that the S/P 
had its own independent influence: “the fact that in general the Staff was somewhat to the left of 
me – and did not subside readily, when we did not immediately agree – was inevitable because I 
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think it is an important function of this Staff to act as a conscience to the Secretary, to the Deputy 
Secretary and to those bureaus that admit that they are not already the repository of total 
wisdom.”143  In conclusion, Secretary Kissinger’s quote tied together both critical functions of 
the S/P as well as the reason for its renewed primacy within the U.S. foreign policy 
establishment today: “You cannot be flexible in tactics unless you have a long-range strategy.  
Only those people can be effective tactically who have some goals.”144   In other words, the 
Policy Planning Staff under the direction of Winston Lord was both influential and successful.  
Above all, the S/P proved it was anything but trivial. 
 
 





































Figure 1:  Graphic of LOS Conference Territorial Concepts 
 
Source: Secure Fisheries Frequently Asked Questions, Secure Fisheries, 









Figure 2: Priority Rank Ordering of Countries by Political/Security Factors 
Factors for Ranking: Population, strategic location, strategic raw material wealth, industrial capacity, 
presence of US Bases, influence on other countries, potentiality of conflict situation, past and current 
identification with the US, and extent of US domestic interest in the country 
 
 
Figure 3: General Priority Rank Ordering of Countries 
Factors for Ranking: All Political/Security Factors listed above combined with Economic/Commercial 
Factors 
 
Source: “Priority Rank Ordering of Countries,” August 15, 1975, Box 348, S/P Files of Winston Lord: 





Figure 4: Henry Kissinger's Edits to the March 10, 1976 Memorandum "Suggested Statement on 
the Rhodesian Crisis 
Source: Winston Lord, Director of Policy Planning, to Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State, Briefing 
Memorandum, “Statement on the Rhodesian Crisis,” March 10, 1976, S/P Files of Winston Lord: Record 





 Like so many of my favorite classes at Yale, I started Professor Charles Hill’s graduate 
seminar “GLBL 885: World Order” unsure of what I was getting myself into or what I was about 
to learn for a semester.  There was no way I could have known sitting in the first seminar that 
Professor Hill would reignite my love for history, a discipline I had sworn off in favor of Global 
Affairs and the study of contemporary foreign policy decision-making since high school.  In a 
short few weeks I gained an entirely new perspective on international relations and the value of 
history, both modern and ancient.  In one session we would go from talking about the 1492 
Peace of Westphalia to 1960 Kissingerian détente to the 430 B.C. Peloponnesian War, all while 
tying themes and lessons together in a completely coherent way. 
 It was perhaps for the first time in Professor Hill’s class that I understood the value and 
importance of a true liberal arts education, and it was that semester when I fell in love with 
history and Yale’s history major anew.  I immediately decided I needed a much deeper 
grounding in history and took almost strictly history courses for the next few semesters.  
Through this new academic lens, I began to understand the importance of history for all 
contemporary decision-making and strategy.  As an athlete and foreign policy buff I have always 
been attracted to the word “strategy,” however I became obsessed with the historical and 
academic study of strategy as it pertained to diplomacy and the international system.  Through a 
combination of my studies in Global Affairs and History I became very interested in the 
conditions that allow for long-term policy planning in contrast to the arguably piecemeal, 
disjointed foreign policy that I grew up surrounded by in the post Cold War United States.  
Ideological opinions aside, I was fascinated Henry Kissinger’s successes in single-handedly 
formulating and advancing American principles internationally. 
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 In Professor Hill’s class we talked briefly about his time working under Secretary 
Kissinger as a young speechwriter for the Policy Planning Staff (S/P) under the directorship of 
Winston Lord (YC ’59).  We also discussed how Secretary Kissinger thought about foreign 
policy within frameworks and was intensely concerned with not just solving day-to-day 
problems but in anticipating future problems.  He sought to advance coherent, consistent 
American principles in our foreign policy.  This is perhaps what Kissinger is best remembered 
for, often to a fault.  In one class, Professor Hill briefly touched on Kissinger’s “Focus Groups” 
or forward looking groups of thinkers (which I would later learn were part of the S/P) who were 
tasked with anticipating events in specific regions and developing forward-looking proposals for 
how the U.S. would react.  I didn’t know it at the time, but this off-hand comment from Professor 
Hill would become the subject of my senior essay. 
 The eight-student seminar culminated in a visit of Dr. Kissinger himself, who spoke with 
us for two hours, answering any questions we had (and signing copies of his newest book, World 
Order).  And it was here where I first learned the name of the S/P and the renewed purpose that 
Secretary Kissinger afforded to this long-term foreign policy planning body.  This visit coincided 
with the gifting of the Henry A. Kissinger Papers to Yale.  After further discussion with 
Professor Hill I decided I would explore the S/P and long-term foreign policy planning under 
Kissinger, hoping to use Yale’s new resources.  Without expecting much, I sent a letter to 
Professor Hill’s former boss, Winston Lord, thanks to a New York City address in Professor 
Hill’s records.  Over the next semester and summer, Winston Lord responded incredibly 
positively to my request for an interview.  We spoke on the phone two or three times about the 
S/P and his view of policy planning as a discipline.  The first thirty minutes of these 
conversations usually had nothing to do with the project, and instead turned to heated debates on 
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the World Cup, Yale Soccer, and Lionel Messi’s shortcomings on the international fùtbol stage.  
It seemed I had real direction and the essay would write itself. 
I returned to Yale in the fall to finish my final season of varsity soccer, to complete my 
Global Affairs senior capstone, and to discover this project would be far harder than I originally 
expected.  I was quickly disappointed as I sorted through the industry of Kissinger scholarship 
including the litany of Kissinger memoirs and biographies including White House Years, Years 
of Upheaval, and Years of Renewal to find that there were very few mentions of Policy Planning 
and even fewer explicit mentions of its effectiveness.  Similarly, the Henry A. Kissinger Papers 
at Yale proved to be quite difficult to make requests from and even more impossible to search.  
Did Kissinger’s memoirs mean that Policy Planning had no effect on his thought process?  Was 
it simply a think-tank without much direct utility for the advancing policy?  The answer, in many 
ways, appeared in Ambassador Winston Lord’s Oral Biography conducted by Charles Stuart 
Kennedy and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker in 1998 for the Association for Diplomatic Studies and 
Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project.  The 800-page oral history (which he promised to 
add more to if anyone topped his page count) provided great direction and background on his 
training and career.  In the interview, Lord discussed how when Kissinger was convinced of a 
new argument or challenged he would rarely admit where this turnaround came from, instead 
opting just to incorporate it into his speeches and briefings with little acknowledgement of its 
source.  Lord also described many of the areas where the S/P was most effective: economic 
issues, human rights policy, and inter-agency negotiations like the Law of the Sea negotiations, 
to name a few.  While I had my topic of interest and some sources to get started, the major 
methodological and academic challenge was determining how to measure the S/P’s influence on 
Secretary Kissinger, particularly given his reluctance to acknowledge his influencers. 
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Beyond Kissinger’s sparing mentions of Winston Lord and Policy Planning, I also 
quickly discovered in my preliminary secondary research that the S/P received little direct study 
from historians as well.  However, the few mentions of Lord’s S/P were always followed by 
praise as one of the most effective tenures of the S/P, despite the 1973 to 1977 period being 
coined the “years of upheaval” by Kissinger himself – a time when the established world order 
seemed to be crumbling.  The near unanimous praise for Lord’s S/P reinforced my notion that I 
was onto something important that could inform my larger questions about U.S. foreign policy 
formation and execution.  The major academic works I initially found on policy planning were 
usually contemporaneous journal articles debating its effectiveness in formulating policy and the 
utility of long-term policy planning for a secretary of state.  Compilations of these studies like 
Daniel Drezner’s Avoiding Trivia: The Role of Strategic Planning in American Foreign Policy 
and Linda Brady’s article “Planning for Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis,” offered 
criticisms of the process of policy planning and long-term strategy that was helpful in framing 
how I would think about the S/P’s utility and limitations as well as ways to measure Lord’s 
effectiveness as director.  With the general lack of secondary sources that directly evaluated the 
actions of Lord and the S/P from 1973 to 1977, I knew that my primary research would have to 
guide the project.   
 The mechanics of some of my first successful primary research may have taught me more 
about the foreign policy establishment and working in government than any amount of reading or 
writing could possibly have done so over my four years as a Global Affairs or History major.  As 
I pulled up to the National Archives II at College Park over Winter Break, I committed what 
would be my first of many bureaucratic mistakes as I tried to drive right by the security guard 
checking IDs at the entrance.  After proceeding through the rest of the exhaustive registration 
process with only a few reprimands, I walked up to the Textual Archives room and got some 
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assistance with my first pull requests: the S/P (Policy Planning) Files of Winston Lord.  And as 
soon as my number was placed on the board I realized that the next few days in College Park 
would be my very own adventure in bureaucracy. Fifty-five boxes were wheeled out to me and I 
realized the Point-and-Shoot camera I brought with me would be far more important than I 
originally planned, as I would not have nearly enough time to read what was necessary at the 
Archives.  So for the next three days my left thumb continually cramped and I filled a 2008 
Nikon camera’s memory card three times over as I sorted through every record of over four years 
of Lord’s government career.  Luckily, based on S/P reports summarizing their own work and 
Lord’s 800 page oral history, I knew certain subject areas to prioritize. 
 This thematic approach proved to be an effective way to examine the decision-making 
process of Secretary Kissinger and the influence of Lord’s Policy S/P on these decisions and to 
meaningfully engage with secondary scholarship.  From Lord’s oral history and refined again 
after my visit to NARA, I decided to focus on analyzing the S/P’s role in U.S. Law of Sea 
negotiations and shifting U.S. policy towards human rights in southern Africa as these seemed to 
be areas that could provide concrete evidence to the oft-cited “golden-age of policy planning.”  I 
benefitted massively from brainstorming sessions with my advisors Professor R. Joseph Parrott 
who forced me to think about how I could actually measure the effectiveness of Lord and the S/P 
in formulating policy and influencing the decisions of Secretary Kissinger.  Through these case 
studies, I would be able to utilize primary documents from the S/P, Winston Lord’s and Henry 
Kissinger’s papers complimented by transcripts of State Department Staff Meetings, journalists 
responses to major U.S. decisions, Lord’s own testimony in our telephone interviews, and 
through event-specific secondary sources.  With this structure set, all of my JPEG pictures from 
NARA manually rotated and sorted into over 100 individual folders, I began the overwhelming 
task of writing, editing, and writing some more. 
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 It was truly a unique experience to have the opportunity to interview, and get to know a 
figure in history that would be the center of senior essay.  All too often we can forget in history 
the importance of personality, demeanor, and a person’s life outside the scope of their work.  In 
many ways, these factors can be the most important, as there is certainly an argument that Lord’s 
close personal relationship with Secretary Kissinger was the root of his influence and 
effectiveness.  It was fascinating learning about Lord through my own research and from his own 
mouth.  My personal knowledge of Lord, as a man, added color to my research in Washington 
D.C. as I stumbled across a memo announcing an S/P Fantasy Football Pool knowing Winston 
Lord’s affinity for the Washington Redskins and more topically, a personal letter from 1975 on 
African race relations sent by his cousin, Philip Pillsbury, Jr., a career Foreign Service Officer 
stationed in Africa at the time.  Speaking with Lord three or four times over the year was 
certainly the most enjoyable part of the senior essay process. 
 I owe an enormous amount of gratitude to both my parents and the rest of my family, 
who convinced this second-semester senior the utility and importance of this project, even when 
I could not fathom reading another page and who made all of this—and I mean all of this—
possible for me in my life.  Thank you to my advisors Professor Paul Kennedy and Professor R. 
Joseph Parrott who were incredible resources when it came to navigating the industry of 
Kissinger scholarship, the National Archives, and all other facets of thesis writing.  Thank you to 
Professor Charles Hill for spurring this project on and introducing me to both my topic and to 
Winston Lord himself.  Most importantly, this project could never have happened without Mr. 
Winston Lord, who restored my reverence for government and the foreign policy institution with 
his compassion, friendliness, and willingness to assist a Yale senior only a few graduating 
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